We develop a model of trading in securities markets with two specialized sides: traders posting quotes ("market makers") and traders hitting quotes ("market takers"). Liquidity cycles emerge naturally, as the market moves from phases with high liquidity to phases with low liquidity. Traders monitor the market periodically to capture pro…t opportunities. Complementarities between the two sides generate multiplicity of equilibria in which either liquidity is high or liquidity vanishes. We show how a reduction in monitoring costs (e.g. due to algorithmic trading) a¤ects the distribution of gains from trade, the monitoring intensities, and the trading rate. We also analyze the optimal fee structure of the trading platform matching market-makers and market-takers. We …nd that it optimally charges di¤erent fees on each side and may even subsidize one side, as observed in reality. The main determinants of the fee structure are the tick-size, the relative number of traders on each side, and the relative cost of monitoring for each side.
Introduction
Trading in securities increasingly takes place in electronic limit order markets. The trading process in these markets feature high frequency cycles made of two phases:
(i) a "make-liquidity"phase during which traders post prices (limit orders) at which they are willing to trade, and (ii) a "take-liquidity" phase during which limit orders are hit by market orders, generating a transaction. The submission of market orders depletes the limit order book of liquidity and ignites a new make/take cycle as it creates transient pro…t opportunities for traders submitting limit orders. 1 A trader reacts to a transient increase or decline in the liquidity of the limit order book only when she becomes aware of this trading opportunity. Accordingly, several empirical studies emphasize the importance of monitoring to understand the dynamics of trades and quotes in limit order markets (e.g., Biais et al. (1995) , Sandås (2001) or Holli…eld et al.(2004) ). For instance, Biais, Hillion, and Spatt (1995) observe that (p.1688): "Our results are consistent with the presence of limit order traders monitoring the order book, competing to provide liquidity when it is rewarded, and quickly seizing favorable trading opportunities." Hence, traders'attention to the trading process is an important determinant of the speed at which make/take liquidity cycles are completed.
In practice, monitoring is costly because intermediaries (brokers, market-makers etc...) have limited monitoring capacity. 2 Hence, the trading rate depends on a trade-o¤ between the bene…t and cost of monitoring. Our goal in this paper is to study this trade-o¤ and its impact on the make/take liquidity cycle. In this way, this paper speaks to two di¤erent sets of related issues.
Firstly, in recent years, algorithmic trading has considerably decreased the cost of monitoring and revolutionized the way liquidity is provided and consumed. We use our model to study the e¤ects of this evolution on the trading rate and the distribution of trading gains between liquidity makers, liquidity takers, and trading platforms. Secondly, the model sheds light on pricing schedules set by trading platforms.
Increasingly, these platforms charge di¤erent fees on market orders (orders "taking liquidity") and limit orders (orders "making liquidity"). The di¤erence between these fees is called the make/take spread and is usually positive. That is, investors providing liquidity pay a lower fee than investors taking liquidity. For instance, Table 1 in Appendix A gives the fees charged on liquidity makers and liquidity takers for U.S. equity trading platforms, as of July 2008. All these platforms subsidize liquidity makers by paying a rebate (or charge zero fees) on limit orders, and charge a fee on liquidity takers (so called "access fees").
This fee structure results in signi…cant monetary transfers between traders taking liquidity, traders making liquidity, and the trading platforms. 3 For this reason, the make/take spread is closely followed by market participants, in particular marketmaking …rms using highly automated strategies. 4 Access fees are the subject of heated debates and, in its regulation NMS, the SEC decided to cap them at $0.003 per share (30% of the tick size) in equity markets. 5 The interest of market participants in these fees suggests that they alter the market microstructure of securities markets.
Yet, to the best of our knowledge, the rationale for the make/take spread and its impact on the trading process have not been analyzed.
We distinguish two sides: (i) traders who post quotes (the "market-makers") and (ii) traders who hit these quotes (the "market-takers"). Both sides must monitor the 3 For instance, in each transaction, BATS (a trading platform for U.S stocks) charges a fee of 0.25 cents per share on market orders and rebates 0.24 cents on executed limit orders (see Table 1 ). On October 10, 2008, 838,488,549 shares of stocks listed on the NYSE were traded on BATS (about 9% of the trading volume in these stocks on this day); see BATS website: http://www.batstrading.com/. Thus, collectively, limit order traders involved in these transactions earned about $2 million on this day only. 4 Some specialized magazines report the fees charged by the various electronic trading platforms in U.S. equity markets. See for instance the "Price of Liquidity" section published by "Traders magazine"; http://www.tradersmagazine.com. 5 As an example of the controversies raised by these fees, see the petition for rulemaking regarding access fees in option markets, addressed by Citadel at the SEC at http://www.sec.gov/rules/petitions/2008/petn4-562.pdf market to grab ‡eeting trading opportunities. In choosing their monitoring intensity, traders on each side trade-o¤ the bene…t from a higher likelihood of detecting a pro…t opportunity with the cost of paying more attention to the trading process. In equilibrium, traders'monitoring choices determine the trading rate.
Monitoring decisions of both sides reinforce each other. Indeed, suppose that an exogenous shock induces market-takers to monitor the market more intensively.
Then, market-makers expect more frequent pro…t opportunities since good prices are hit more quickly. Hence, they monitor more and as a consequence the market features good prices more frequently, which in turn induces market-takers to monitor more. Thus, the initial shock on market-takers'monitoring is ampli…ed, and triggers a snowballing e¤ect on trading activity.
This complementarity in monitoring decisions creates a coordination problem, which results in two equilibria: (i) an equilibrium with no monitoring and no trading; and (ii) an equilibrium with monitoring and trading. 6 In the latter equilibrium, monitoring decisions depend on the factors that determine the cost and bene…t of monitoring, namely (i) the monitoring cost of each side; (ii) the number of participants on each side; (iii) the tick size (the minimum price increment between two quotes); and (iv) trading fees For …xed trading fees, a decrease in the monitoring cost on one side increases traders'monitoring on both sides because of the complementarity in monitoring decisions. Now, consider an increase in the number of market-makers. On the one hand, the probability that market-takers …nd good prices when they check the market becomes higher. Thus, they monitor more intensively which, through the snowballing e¤ect we described previously, induces market-makers to monitor more, other things equal. But competition among market-makers reduces each one's market share. This 6 It is well-known that the lack of coordination in traders'decision to participate in a market can lead to multiple equilibria with di¤ering levels of liquidity (see Admati and P ‡eiderer (1988) , Pagano (1989) , and Dow (2005) for example). In our setting, the multiplicity of equilibria also stems from a coordination problem, but between traders posting quotes on the one hand and traders hitting quotes on the other hand. This type of e¤ect could explain why limit order markets exhibit sudden and short-lived booms and busts in trading rates during the trading day (see Hasbrouck (1999) second e¤ect reduces market-makers' incentives to monitor. In our model, the …rst e¤ect dominates in equilibrium so that the total monitoring intensity of both sides increases in the number of market-makers. As a result the trading rate increases when (i) the monitoring cost decreases or (ii) the number of participants on either side become larger.
A larger tick size translates into larger gains from trade for market-makers. 7 Thus, other things being equal, an increase in the tick size is conducive to more monitoring by market-makers. Hence, market-takers (i) obtain less surplus per transaction but (ii) expect more frequent trading opportunities when the tick size is larger. In equilibrium, the …rst e¤ect dominates. Thus, an increase in the tick size enlarges market-makers'monitoring intensity, but it decreases market-takers'monitoring intensities. For this reason, the e¤ect of a change in the tick size on the trading rate is not monotonic, and the trading rate is maximal for a strictly positive tick size.
Next, we analyze the determination of the fee structure -the breakdown between the fees charged on market-makers and market-takers by the trading platform. When the total fee per trade is …xed, we …nd that there is a unique fee structure that maximizes the trading rate and thereby the trading platform's pro…t. For instance, suppose that the tick size is very small. If the total trading fee is equally split between both sides (a zero make/take spread), then market-makers monitor the market less than market takers since they obtain a very small fraction of the gains from trade.
Thus, trade opportunities are lost because the market frequently lacks good prices when it is checked by market-takers. In this sense, there is an excess of attention by market takers. In this situation, it is optimal for the trading platform to increase its fee on market-takers and reduce the fee charged on market-makers. This shift in the make/take spread helps to balance the monitoring intensities of both sides, and thereby the demand and supply of liquidity. Ultimately, it increases the trading rate.
Using this logic, we …nd that the optimal fee charged on market-makers (resp. market-takers) increases (resp. decreases) with (i) the tick size; (ii) the ratio of the number of market-makers to the number of market-takers; and (iii) the ratio of market-takers'monitoring cost to market-makers'monitoring cost. In particular, it can be optimal for the trading platform to subsidize market-makers when (a) the number of market-makers is relatively low; (b) market-makers' monitoring cost is relatively large; or (c) the tick size is low. Importantly, these …ndings do not depend on the trading platform's market power since they hold for all levels of the total fee earned by the trading platform. Hence, the make/take spread should not per se be construed as a sign of imperfect competition between trading platforms.
Interestingly, in line with the model, the practice of subsidizing market-makers developed after the tick size was reduced to a penny in 2001 in U.S. equity markets.
The recent decision of some options markets in the U.S. to adopt a make/take pricing structure also coincides with a reduction in the tick size of these markets. 8 According to our model, the subsidy of the market-making side could also re ‡ect (i) a relatively small number of …rms engaged in electronic market-making relative to the number of investors demanding liquidity; or/and (ii) a faster automation of their search for liquidity by these investors.
The model also implies that a reduction in the cost of monitoring for markettakers shifts the division of the trading surplus in favor of market-makers (and vice versa). Indeed, the trading platform optimally reacts to a decrease in monitoring cost for market-takers by charging a larger fee on market-takers, and a smaller fee on market-makers. Market-takers'trading surplus vanishes when their monitoring cost becomes in…nitesimal.
Our analyses is related to several strands of research. Foucault, Roëll and Sandås (2003) and Liu (2008) provide theoretical and empirical analyzes of market-making with costly monitoring. However, the e¤ects in these models are driven by marketmakers' exposure to adverse selection and they do not study the role of trading platforms'fees. Hendershott et al.(2008) …nd empirically that the development of algorithmic trading is associated with a reduction in bid-ask spreads and an increase in the trading rate. In line with their …ndings, our model implies that a decrease in monitoring cost can lead to a signi…cant increase in trading rates (through the snowballing e¤ect described previously). Thus, it implies a sharp increase in trading volume after upgrades in trading platforms facilitating algorithmic trading. 9 It also implies that the speed of automation of the market-making sector relative to the market-taking sector should a¤ect the make-take spread and thereby the distribution of trading pro…ts between these sectors.
Our analysis also contributes to the burgeoning literature on two-sided markets Section 2 describes the model. In Section 3, we study the determinants of traders' equilibrium monitoring intensities for …xed fees of the trading platform. We endogenize these fees and derive the optimal fee structure for the trading platform in Section 4. Section 5 concludes. The proofs are in Appendix B.
Model

Market Participants
We consider a market for a security with two distinct sides: "market-makers" and "market-takers." Market-makers are those who post prices (limit orders); whereas market-takers are those who hit the quotes (submit market orders) to complete a transaction. 11 The number of market-makers and market-takers is, respectively, M 9 In 2007, the trading volume on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) has increased by a stunning 69%. Market observers attribute this increase to upgrades in the LSE trading platform enabling algoritmic traders to get faster access to this platform. 2005)). 13 As market-takers have a higher valuation than market-makers, they will buy the security from market-makers. In a more complex model, we could assume that market-takers have either high or low valuations relative to market-makers so that they can be buyers or sellers. This possibility adds to the mathematical complexity of the model, but provides no additional economic insight.
Market-makers and market-takers meet on a trading platform with a positive tick-size denoted by > 0 and the …rst price on the grid above v 0 is half a tick above v 0 . Let a v 0 + 2 be this price. All trades take place at this price because marketorders constitute the market-making side whereas traders submitting market orders constitute the market-taking side. Sometimes, the market-making and market-taking sides are designated respectively as the passive and active (or aggressive) side. See for instance Chi-X at http://www.chix.com/Cheaper.html 1 2 Bertsimas and Lo (1998) solve the dynamic optimization of such traders, assuming that they exclusively use market orders as we do here. takers refuse to trade at a larger price on the grid ( 2 < L < 3 2 ) and market-makers would lose money if they trade at a smaller price than a on the grid. Thus, we focus on a "one tick market" similar, for example, to Parlour (1998) . For the problem to be interesting, we assume that a …xed number of shares (normalized to one) can be pro…tably o¤ered at price a. In a more complex model, this limit could follow for instance from exposure to informed trading as in Glosten (1994) . 14 The trading platform charges trading fees each time a trade occurs. The fee (per share) paid by a market-maker is denoted c m ; whereas the fee paid by a market-taker is denoted c t . Thus, per transaction, the platform earns a revenue c c m + c t . We assume that the cost of processing trades for the trading platform is zero. Introducing an order processing cost per trade is straightforward and does not change the results. 15 Thus, the gains for trade in each transaction (L) are split between the parties to the transaction and the trading platform as follows: the market-taker obtains
the market-maker obtains
and the platform obtains c. Thus, the gains from trade net of the fee earned by the trading platform are L c. We focus on the case in which c < L since otherwise traders on one side at least lose money on each trade, and thereby would choose not to trade at all.
This setup is clearly very stylized. Yet, it captures in the simplest possible way the essence of the liquidity cycles described in the introduction. Speci…cally, when there is no quote at a; the market lacks liquidity and there is a pro…t opportunity for marketmakers. Indeed, the …rst market-maker who submits an o¤er at a will serve the next buy market order and earns m . Conversely, when there is an o¤er at a, liquidity is plentiful and there is a pro…t opportunity (worth t ) for a market-taker. After a trade, the market switches back to a state in which liquidity is scarce. Consequently, the market oscillates between a state in which there is a pro…t opportunity for marketmakers and a state in which there is a pro…t opportunity for market-takers. Thus, market-makers and market-takers have an incentive to monitor the market. Marketmakers are looking for periods when liquidity is scarce and market-takers are looking for periods when liquidity is plentiful.
Cycles, Monitoring, and Timing
We now de…ne the notion of "cycles," discuss the monitoring activities of market participants, and explain the timing of the game.
Cycles. This is an in…nite horizon model with a continuous time line. At each point in time the market can be in one of two states:
1. State E -Liquidity is scarce (empty book). A limit order is not posted at a:
2. State F -Liquidity is plentiful (full book). A limit order for one share is posted at a:
The market moves from state E to state F when a market-maker notices the pro…t opportunity and posts a quote at a. The market moves from state F back to state E when a market-taker notices the pro…t opportunity and hits the quote. Then, the process starts over again. We call the ‡ow of events from the moment the market gets into state E until it returns into this state -a "make/take cycle" or for brevity just a "cycle."
Monitoring. Market-makers and market-takers have an incentive to monitor the market to be the …rst to detect a pro…t opportunity for their side. We formalize monitoring as follows. Each market-maker i = 1; :::; M inspects the market according to a Poisson process with parameter i , that characterizes her monitoring intensity.
As a result, the time between one inspection of the market to the next by marketmaker i is distributed exponentially with an average inter-inspection time of
Similarly, each market-taker j = 1; :::; N chooses a monitoring intensity j ; which means that he inspects the market according to a Poisson process with parameter j : 16 The total inspection frequency of all market-makers is 1 + :::
and the total inspection frequency of market-takers is
When a market-maker inspects the market she learns whether the book is empty
If the book is empty the market-maker places a limit order at a; whereas if the book is full she stays put until her next inspection. Similarly, a market-taker submits a market order when he learns that the book is full, and stays put until the next inspection otherwise. Thus, market-makers compete against each other for seizing occasional pro…t opportunities re ‡ected in empty books, and market-takers compete with each other for seizing pro…t opportunities re ‡ected in full books. Market-makers and market-takers provide liquidity to one another as pro…ts can only be realized after a limit order has been hit by a market order.
In practice, monitoring can be manual, by looking at a computer screen, or automated by using automated algorithms. For humans, the need to monitor several stocks contemporaneously limits the monitoring capacity and constrains the amount of attention dedicated to a speci…c stock. Computers have also a …xed computing capacity that must be allocated over potentially hundreds of stocks and millions of pieces of information that require processing. Prioritization of this process is conceptually similar to the allocation of attention across di¤erent stocks by a human 1 6 Note that we restrict attention to stochastic monitoring policies. This rules out deterministic monitoring such as inspecting the market exactly once every certain number of minutes. The time interval between two inspections is random as many unforeseen events can capture the attention of a market-maker or a market-taker, be it human or a machine. For humans, the need to monitor several securities as well as perform other tasks precludes evenly spaced inspections. Computers face a similar constraints as periods of high transaction volume, and unexpectedly high tra¢ c on communication lines prevent monitoring at exact points in time.
market-marker. Hence, in all cases, monitoring the market for a security more intensively is costly, because it reduces the monitoring of other securities.
To account for this cost, we assume that, over a time interval of length T , a market-maker choosing a monitoring intensity i bears a monitoring cost:
Similarly, the cost of inspecting the market for market-taker j over an interval of time of length T is
Thus, the cost of monitoring is assumed to be proportional to the time interval and convex in the monitoring intensity.
Parameters ; > 0 control the level of monitoring costs for a given monitoring intensity. We say that market-makers'(resp. market-takers') monitoring cost become lower when ( ) decreases. This would be a result, for example, of automation of the monitoring process:
Timing. In reality, traders can change their monitoring intensities as market conditions change whereas trading fees are usually …xed over a longer period of time.
Thus, it is natural to assume that traders choose their monitoring intensities after observing the fees set by the trading platform. Thus, we assume that the trading game unfolds as follows:
1. The trading platform chooses the fees c m and c t .
2. Market-makers and market-takers simultaneously choose their monitoring intensities i and j .
3. Rest of the game. From this point onward, the game is played on a continuous time line inde…nitely, with the monitoring intensities and fees determined in stages 1 and 2.
Objective Functions and Equilibrium
We now describe market participants' objective functions and de…ne the notion of equilibrium that is used to solve for players'optimal actions in each stage.
Objective functions. Recall that a make/take cycle is the ‡ow of events from the time the book is in state E until it goes back to this state. Each time a make/take cycle is completed a transaction occurs. The probability that market-maker i wins this transaction is the probability that she inspects an empty book …rst (before the other market-makers do). Given our assumptions, this probability is p i 
Similarly, the probability that market-taker j wins the transaction in a speci…c cycle is q j j ; and the expected pro…t per cycle is
Finally, the pro…t from a completed transaction for the trading platform is c for sure.
The average time it takes the book to move from state E to state F is 
Letñ T denote the random variable describing the number of completed transactions (cycles) until time T: The expected payo¤ to market-maker i until time T (net of monitoring costs) is
where the expectation is taken over the number of completed cycles up to time T:
As is common in in…nite horizon Markovian models, we assume that the objective function of each player is to maximize his/her long-term (steady-state) payo¤ per unit of time. That is, market-maker i seeks to maximize
A standard theorem from the theory of stochastic processes (see Ross (1996) , p. 133) implies that im is equal to the expected payo¤ for market maker i per make/take cycle divided by the expected duration of a cycle. Thus, using equations (3) and (5), we can rewrite the objective function of market-maker i (equation (6))
Similarly, the objective function of market-taker j is to maximize his expected payo¤ per cycle divided by the expected length of a cycle,
From (7) and (8), other things being equal, the expected pro…t (gross of monitoring costs) of a trader on one side (e.g., the market-making side) declines in the monitoring intensities chosen by the traders on the same side. For instance,
(for j 6 = i). Thus, traders' monitoring decisions on one side are substitutes. Intuitively, this e¤ect re ‡ects the fact that traders on the same side compete for the same trading opportunities. They are engaged in a race to be …rst to detect a trading opportunity when it appears. 17 Conversely, the expected pro…t of a trader on one side increases in the monitoring intensities of the traders on the other side. For instance,
That is, marketmakers are more likely to check the state of the market frequently when they expect market-takers to inspect quotes frequently and vice versa. Thus, market-makers and market-takers'monitoring decisions reinforce each other.
Using the same type of argument as for market-makers and market-takers, we write the objective function of the trading platform as
where 
For tractability, we further restrict attention to symmetric equilibria, i.e. equilibria in which 1 = 2 = ::: = M and 1 = 2 = :::
Then, given a symmetric Nash equilibrium in the monitoring intensities, we solve the trading platform's problem by …nding the fee structure (c m ; c t ) that maximizes equation (9).
Equilibrium Monitoring Intensities in the Short Run
In this section we …rst study the equilibrium monitoring intensities for a given set of fees (c m ; c t ). Thus, the comparative statics result obtained in this section describe the short run adjustments of monitoring intensities and trading rates to an change in the parameters (M; N; etc...). In the longer run, trading fees should adjust as well, as described in the next section.
For all parameters values, the model admits exactly two equilibria: (i) an equilibrium with no trading; and (ii) an equilibrium with trading. This multiplicity of equilibria is due to the complementarity in market-makers and market-takers'monitoring decisions.
The rationale behind the no-trade equilibrium is simple. If a market-maker expects that market-takers do not monitor the quotes on the trading platform, then she expects no trade on the platform. Given that monitoring is costly, it is not worth for her to inspect the state of the platform, and so she sets i = 0: Similarly, if a market-taker expects market-makers not to post quotes, then he has no incentive to monitor, setting j = 0. Thus, traders'beliefs that the other side will not be active are self-ful…lling and result in a no-monitoring, no-trade equilibrium. When z > 1 (resp. z < 1); the ratio of pro…ts to costs per cycle is larger for marketmakers (resp. market-takers). 
where is the unique positive solution to the cubic equation
Moreover,
= :
This unique equilibrium with trading has several interesting properties. First, the aggregate monitoring intensities of both sides, and ; are positively related.
Indeed,
Thus, a shock on the parameters a¤ecting the total monitoring intensity of one side also a¤ects the monitoring intensity of the other side in the same direction. This change in the monitoring intensity of the other side ampli…es the initial e¤ect of the shock.
Consider for instance an increase in the number of market-makers. Using equation (16) , the e¤ect on market-makers'total monitoring is:
The …rst term on the R.H.S is positive and captures the direct e¤ect of an increase in the number of market-makers. Namely market-makers'total monitoring is larger because they are more numerous. But in turn, this e¤ect is conducive to more monitoring by market-takers as they expect trading opportunities to be more frequent. As a consequence, market-takers monitor more in equilibrium ( @ @M > 0). This increase feeds back positively on market-makers'incentive to monitor, and thereby ampli…es the initial increase in market-makers'monitoring intensity. This ampli…cation e¤ect is captured by the second term on the R.H.S of equation (17) . As explained previously, this corollary shows that a change in the cost-bene…t of monitoring for one side a¤ects the monitoring levels of both sides. For instance, an increase in the fee on market-makers, c m , decreases the bene…t per trade for marketmakers, m . Thus, it directly decreases market-makers'monitoring intensity and it indirectly decreases market-takers' monitoring intensities, since monitoring of both sides are complements. 18 In equilibrium, there can be an imbalance in the aggregate attention of each side to the trading process, as shown by the next corollary. As larger fees reduce the demand for trading, the trading platform faces the standard price-quantity trade-o¤ for a monopolist.
We solve for the optimal fees in two steps. In the …rst step we …x the total fees c = c m + c t ; and ask how this total should be allocated between market makers fees (c m ) and market takers fees (c s ). In the second stage, we solve for the optimal c; establishing the complete fee schedule.
To start, consider an exogenously given total fees c: In this case, the problem of the trading platform is to …nd the fee structure (c m ; c t ) that maximizes it trading rate. That is, it solves:
The …rst order conditions to this problem impose that:
That is, the trading platform should choose its fee structure so as to equalize the marginal negative impact of an increase in each fee on trading volume. Let
tm @ log( ) @c t and tt @ log( ) @c t .
Variables mm and tm measure the elasticities of the total monitoring level of the market-making side to the fee charged on the market-makers. Variables tm and tt measure the elasticities of the total monitoring level of the market-making side to the fee charged on the market-takers. Using equation (21), we obtain the following result.
Proposition 3
For each level c of the total fee charged by the platform, there is a unique allocation of this fee between the market-making side and the market-taking side that maximizes the trading rate. The optimal fee structure is obtained for c m and c t such that:
where
The elasticities of monitoring levels to a change in fees depend themselves on the fees through , m ; and t . Thus, the optimal fee structure is implicitly de…ned by equation (23). In general, we cannot obtain a closed-form solution for the optimal fee structure. In the next section, to develop intuition, we consider in details the particular case in which M = N = 1 in which we can characterize in closed-form the optimal fee structure. Then, in Section 4.2, we show that the insights obtained in this case are robust in the general case and we also analyze the e¤ect of changing the number of market participants on the optimal fee structure.
We refer to c m c t as being the make/take spread. The make/take spread is zero when the fee structure is ‡at (i.e., c m = c t ) and positive if the market-making side pays a larger fee than the market-taking side. In general, there is no reason to expect a ‡at fee structure to be optimal (i.e., h = 1=2 in equation (23)). We …rst provide an example that illustrates this point. Thus, for these numerical values, charging the same fee on both sides is not optimal for the platform. The optimal fee structure is in fact such that c m 0:088 and c t 0:011, so that the market-making side is charged more than the markettaking side (see Proposition 4 below). For this fee structure, the trading rate is 0:039 trades per unit of time (an increase of 0.5%). The monitoring intensity of the marketmaking side is 0:085 and the monitoring intensity of the market-taking side is 0:072. At the optimal fee structure, there is still excess attention by market-makers (because they have lower cost of monitoring) but less than in the ‡at fee structure.
The Case
When M = N = 1, the solution to equation (15) is = z 1 3 . Thus, using equations (13) and (14), we obtain the monitoring intensities of the market-making side and the market-taking side:
Using these expressions, we can solve for the optimal total fee charged by the trading platform ( c ) and the optimal breakdown of this fee between the market-making and the market taking sides. We obtain the following result.
Proposition 4 Let r . When M = N = 1, the trading platform optimally allocates its fee c between the market-making side and the market taking side as follows:
For these fees, z = r 
Moreover, if the trading platform is a for-pro…t monopolist, it sets c at c = L 2 .
The …rst part of the proposition (Equation (26)) gives the optimal allocation of the total trading fee between the market-making side and the market-taking side. It is worth stressing that this allocation is the same for any level c of the fee charged by the trading platform as long as it is less than L (otherwise trading volume is nil). As explained previously, this allocation maximizes the trading rate for a …xed revenue c per trade for the trading platform.
This means that the results regarding the allocation of the trading charge between the market-making and the market-taking sides are not driven by the trading platform's market power. Rather, price discreteness is key. Indeed, it prevents marketmakers from fully neutralizing a change in fees by an adjustment in their o¤ers. For instance, market-makers cannot fully pass-through a decrease in their trading fee by quoting a more attractive price because their quotes must be on the grid. Thus, the trading platform can use trading fees to control traders' monitoring intensities and achieve higher trading rates, for any …xed level of the total trading fee.
Of course, the level of the fee chosen by the trading platform depends on its Thus, to maximize the trading rate, market-makers should pay a larger fraction of the fee charged by the trading platform when the tick size enlarges. Intuitively, when the tick size is large, a market-maker has a high incentive to inspect the state of the market since it gets a high fraction of the gains from trade. But, by symmetry, this means that a market-taker's incentive to inspect the state of the market is small. As a consequence, trading opportunities are missed because the market-taker does not inspect frequently the state of the market. In this case, there is excess attention by market-makers. Thus, it is optimal for the platform to allocate a larger fraction of the total fee to the market-maker so as to better balance the monitoring intensities of both sides. If the tick size is small, the symmetric argument applies: market-makers do not inspect the market su¢ ciently frequently. Thus, in absence of monetary inducements, the market appears illiquid to market-takers, and again trading opportunities are lost.
Interestingly, when the tick size is small enough, the trading platform optimally subsidizes market-makers (i.e., c m < 0). 19 As pointed out in the introduction, this implication of the model matches the fact that the practice of subsidizing limit orders in U.S. markets coincide with a sharp reduction in the tick size of these markets.
Moreover, the tick size on the trading platforms that pioneered this practice in the U.S (trading platforms such Archipelago or Island) was initially much smaller than the incumbent markets. 20 The model also implies that the make-take spread increases in the ratio of markettakers to market-makers'monitoring cost (r = ). Thus, other things equal, marketmakers contribute relatively more to the total fee per transaction when their monitoring costs per unit of time decreases in relative terms. Thus, the make/take spread observed in reality may re ‡ect the fact that monitoring costs is relatively higher for the market-making side. One possible reason is that institutional investors who need to take a position in a list of stocks need to focus only on trading opportunities in this list of names. In contrast, electronic market-makers monitor the entire universe of stocks, unless they decide to specialize. Thus, their opportunity cost of monitoring one stock is likely to be higher than for the market-taking side. Using equation (27) in Proposition 4, we obtain that in equilibrium:
We deduce the following result.
Corollary 4
In the case M = N = 1: 1 9 In this case, one may wonder whether it is not optimal for a market-maker to undercut its competitors by posting an o¤er at a when an o¤er is already standing at a. Given the optimal fees charged by the platform, this is never optimal however since this yields a pro…t of a v0 c m = Thus, the trading rate is inversely related to traders' monitoring cost and positively related to the size of gains from trade. It is independent from the tick size.
Thus, the model implies that algorithmic trading (a reduction in monitoring costs) enlarges the trading rate.
The e¤ect of the number of participants on the trading fees
We now turn to the analysis of the optimal fees for an arbitrary number of participants on each side. First, we consider the particular case in which (i) the number of participants on both sides are identical and (ii) all traders bear the same monitoring cost. In this case, we say that the market-making side and the market-taking sides are symmetric.
Proposition 5 When N = M and = , it is optimal for the trading platform to break its total fee c between market-makers and market-takers as follows:
The associated monitoring levels in equilibrium are: Thus, in this case, the fees charged on each side are independent of the number of participants. Moreover, as in the case analyzed in the previous section, the maketake spread (c m c t ) increases in the tick size. In fact, the pricing strategy of the platform consists in allocating the total fee between the two sides in such a way that the bene…t of monitoring are equalized ( m = t ). In this way, both sides have equal attention to the trading process
This solution is quite natural since both sides are symmetric. When there is an imbalance in the number of participants on each side, we have not been able to derive the fees chosen by the trading platform in closed-form. However, we can prove the following result.
Proposition 6 Let r . For a …xed number of participants on the market-taking side, the fee charged on market-takers (resp. market-makers) increases (resp. de-creases) in the number of market-takers. That is: 
When N = M and = 1 the trading chooses its fee structure so as to equalize the bene…t of monitoring for the market-making side and the market-making side. When M > N , this solution is not optimal anymore since it results in excessive attention by the market-making side. In this situation, as implied by Corollary 6, it is optimal for the trading platform to raise its fee on the market-making side and decrease its fee on the market-taking side so as to rebalance the attention of both sides. Figure 1 shows how the fees charged on market-takers and market-makers change as the number of market-takers increases from N = 10 to N = 1000. As implied by Proposition 6, the make-take spread becomes smaller as the number of market-takers enlarges. When N is large enough, it is optimal for the trading platform to subsidize the side that is relatively "short" in participants (here market-makers). Thus, as the number of market-takers increases, the fraction of the gains from trade captured by market-takers get smaller. Figure 2 shows how the trading rate varies with the number of market-takers. It also compares the trading rate when the trading platform optimally allocates its total fee between the two sides and when it follows the simpler, but suboptimal, policy of splitting equally its fee between the market-makers and the market-takers.
Conclusion
This paper considers a model in which traders must monitor the market to seize trading opportunities. One group of traders ("market-makers") specialize in posting quotes while another group of traders ("market-takers") specialize in hitting quotes.
Market-makers monitor the market to be the …rst to submit a new competitive quote after a transaction. Market-takers monitor the market to be the …rst to hit a competitive quote. In this way, we model the high frequency make/take liquidity cycles observed in electronic security markets.
Our main …ndings are as follows:
1. Monitoring decisions by market-makers and market-takers are complements.
Thus, there is a coordination problem in the decisions of both sides that can result in high or low levels of trading activity.
2. An increase in the number of participants on one side or a decrease in the monitoring cost of one side result in more attention by both sides and a higher trading rate.
3. For a …xed trading fee earned by the platform, there is an allocation of this fee between market-makers and market-takers that maximizes the trading rate.
This allocation is such that there is a make/take spread: the fee charged on market-makers is di¤erent from the fee charged on market-takers.
4. The make/take spread enlarges with (i) the tick size, (ii) the ratio of the number of market-makers to the number of market-takers and (iii) the ratio of markettakers monitoring cost to market-makers'monitoring cost.
5. When fees are set optimally, market-makers (resp. market-takers) get a smaller fraction of the gains from trade when (i) their number enlarges or (ii) their monitoring costs decreases. 
Appendix B
Proof of Proposition 1: Direct from the argument in the text.
Proof of Proposition 2: From (11), the …rst order condition for market-maker i is:
Summing over all i = 1; : : : M , we obtain
Similarly, for market-takers we obtain,
Let : Dividing (34) and (35) by 2 we have,
Dividing these two equations gives,
or equivalently,
We argue that this cubic equation has a unique positive solution. Indeed, this equation is equivalent to = g( ; M; N; z):
with
Function g( ; M; N; z) decreases in . It tends to plus in…nity as goes to zero, and to N 1 N as goes to in…nity. Thus, (39) has a unique positive solution that we denote by .
To obtain a full characterization of the aggregate monitoring levels in equilibrium, insert this root into Equations (36) and (37). Traders'individual monitoring levels then follow since, in a symmetric equilibrium, i = =M and j = =N for all i; j.
Proof of Corollary 1:
Recall that is such that:
= g( ; M; N; z); 
Now, using Equations (42) and (13), we conclude that:
Similarly, using equations (43) and (14), we deduce that
This proves the …rst part of Corollary 1. We also have = .
Thus, using equations (42) and (43) 
The optimal fee structure is such that:
@V ol( ; ) @c t = @V ol( ; ) @c m
Thus, using equations (45) and (46), we deduce that:
Using this equation, the proposition is then straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Consider the case M = N = 1
Step 1: Optimal fee structure for each level of c. 
Then, plugging (50), (51), and (52) into equations (24) and (25), we obtain the required expressions for 1 and 1 :
Step 2: Optimal c. Now we determine the optimal level of its fee by the trading platform. Using the expressions for 1 and 1 given in equation (28), the expected pro…t of the trading platform is:
(1 + r . Thus, it is immediate that the optimal level of c for the trading platform is c = L=2.
Proof of Corollary 4 Immediate from equation (29).
Proof of Corollary 5 Immediate from the de…nition of the trading rate and the expressions for 1 and 1 given in equation (28). In Proposition 5, the fees charged on market-makers and market-takers is such that m = t and therefore z = 1 since = . Moreover, since N = M , we have = 1
Proof of Proposition
for these fees. Thus, the fees given in the proposition are such that = . But then, using the previous expressions, we obtain: Thus, the fees given in Proposition 5 satisfy Equation (23). Thus, they are optimal for the trading platforms when market-makers and market-takers are symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 6: to be written. Optimal Make/take Spread Zero Make-Take Spread
